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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 18143

-vs-

HOYT GLENNY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged with and found guilty
of forcible

sodomy under Section 76-5-403, Utah Code Ann.,

1953 as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The prosecution was handled by the Iron County
Attorney, Mr. James L. Shumate.

The Defendant was

represented by Mr. Scott J. Thorley, who was acting as the
Iron County Public Defender.

The Defendant was convicted

on October 29, 1981, and was sentenced on December 11, 1981,
in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County,
Utah.

The sentence the Defendant received was incarceration

in the Utah State Prison for a period of time not less
than five (5) years nor more than his natural life.
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The

Defendant is presently incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison upon this same, said conviction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
"

The Defendant seeks a reversal of the conviction
for forcible

sodomy in this case.

In the alternative,

if the Court so deems appropriate pursuant to the
Defendant's position as stated herein, the Defendant seeks
a remand to the trial Court for a retrial of this caseo
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The factual situation incident to this case
transpired in Cedar City, Iron County, Utah, on or about
July 3, 1981.

On that said date, the Defendant was a

resident of Room #17 of the American Motel.

Also, on that

said date, John Cooper, a thirteen (13) year-old resident
of Cedar City, Utah, was in the area of the American Motel
searching for and collecting aluminum cans for recycling.
John Cooper knocked on the door of Room #17 and the
Defendant opened the door and invited John Cooper in.

John

Cooper went into the room and after the initial greetings
and amenities, the Defendant learned that Mr. Cooper was
collecting aluminum cans, and so he offered John

Coop~r

two six-packs of beer located 1n the refrigerator of the
rnotelroorn.

John Cooper went to the refrigerator, got the

two six-packs of beer, drank one of the cans, and kept the
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remainder pursuant to the agreement.

A discussion was also

made whereby the Defendant offered John Cooper some money
if he, John Cooper, would run an errand to the Lunt Motel

where the Defendant had left some clothes and possessions,
and retrieve same for the Defendant.

.

John Cooper then left

the American M6tel and went to the Lunt Motel, but was
unable to obtain the clothes and possessions of the Defendant
and so he returned to Room #17 of the American Motel, went
in and informed the Defendant of what had transpired.
At this point, the testimony of the prosecution witness,
John Cooper, and that of the Defendant, Hoyt Glenny, begin
to significantly differ.
John Cooper testified as follows.

That when

John Cooper returned to Room #17, he was again invited in,
but the Defendant shut the door behind him.

The Defendant

then gave John Cooper $5.00 for the errand that he had run.
The Defendant then asked John Cooper to come over to the
chair upon which he was sitting.

John Cooper then sat on

the Defendant's lap and the Defendant kissed him on the lips.
After that, the Defendant started to rub John Cooper's penis
through the long pants and underwear John Cooper was

w~aring.

Then the Defendant slipped the underwear down and started
rubbing the penis directly.

At the Defendant's request,

John Cooper got up and sat on the bed, and was apparently
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joined by the Defendant on the bed.

On the bed, the

Defendant held John Cooper down by pushing him down on the
chest.

John Cooper stated, "he put his mouth to it",

(T.T. P. 56, L28).

After that, John Cooper stated,

"he~

started just putting his mouth--started rubbing my penis

again", (T. T. P·. 57, Ls. 16, 17).

After that, the prosecutor

asked John Cooper the question of, "was it while you were
on the bed that he put his mouth on your penis?"
Ls.21,22).

(T.T. P. 57,

In response to that question, John Cooper

responded, nYes."

(Tc T. PG

57, L23).

After that, on cross-

examination, the defense counsel asked John Cooper, "Okay.
And then he asked you if there had been any contact between
Mr. Glenny's mouth and your penis, isn't that right?''
P. 62, Ls.17, 18., 19).

Cooper stated, "Yes".

(T.T.

In response to this question, John

(T.T. P:.62,

L20)~

After that, also

on cross-examination, the defense counsel asked, ''Okay.

And

then didn't you tell him that you were--that he was sitting
in the chair when he put his mouth to
word, 'dick', is that right?"

your--an~

you used the

(T.T. P. 67, Ls.27, 28, 29).

·In response to that question, John Cooper stated, "Yes".
(T.T. P. 67, L30).

At no point in the trial transcrie~ did

the prosecution witness, John Cooper, testify that his penis
was inserted in or into the mouth of the Defendant.
At the point that John Co~per returned to Room #17
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of the American Motel, the Defendant, Hoyt Glenny, testified
as follows.

Upon John Cooper's return to Room #17 of the

American Motel after running his errand, the Defendant paid
John Cooper $2.00 for running the errand.

Upon John Cooper's

return, the Defendant was fairly well intoxicated, being he
.
had been sipping whiskey, but that his memory of the entire
matter was clear.

After John Cooper was paid the money for

doing his errand, the Defendant invited him to come over and
sit down on his lap.

John Cooper then complied and the

Defendant kissed John Cooper on the forehead below the hairline.

That at no time did the Defendant touch his lips to

any other part of John Cooper's body.

Also, neither John

Cooper or the Defendant were on the bed at any time.

The

Defendant also,···testified that he has emphysema and as a
result, walking and breathing of the Defendant is extremely
difficult.

Irt fact, taking the ten to fifteen steps

necessary would have been very difficult.

The Defendant did

also never open up the pants or unzip or lower the underwear
of John Cooper.

The Defendant also stated that at the time

John Cooper was sitting on his lap, he placed his hand on
John Cooper's thigh in a gesture of "thanks-a-lot".
It is interesting to note that John Cooper testified
that the Defendant had his mouth on the penis of John Cooper
for just a few seconds.

(T.T. P. 57, 126).
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For the purposes of argument herein, the
factual situation as brought forth by the Respondent, State
of Utah, will be deemed the correct factual situation.
This is done solely for the purpose of viewing the evidence
in the best light of the prosecution, and in no way is an
admittance that the facts as propounded by the Respondent,
State of Utah, are correct.

The Defendant will attempt to

show that even though the facts of the case are brought
forth in the best light for the prosecution, the Defendant
should still prevail in this action.

LAW AND ARGUMENT
ISSUE I

WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE HAS PROVEN
THE CRIME OF SODOMY.
As can be seen in the facts as reiterated above,
the transcript is positive that the Defendant's mouth was
on the penis of John Cooper, or to the penis of John
Cooper, or that there was contact between the Defendant's
mouth and John Cooper, but at no point is there any
evidence that the penis was inserted 1n or into the mouth
of the Defendant.
The Defendant was charged under a Utah
sodomy statute, Section 76-5-403, Utah Code Ann., 1953

-6-
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as amended, which is as follows, to-wit:
A person commits sodomy when he engages
in any sexual act involving the genitals
of one person and the mouth or annus of
another person, regardless of the sex of
either participant.
A person commits forcible sodomy when he
commits sodomy upon another without the
other's consent.
Sodomy is a class B misdemeanor.
Forcible
sodomy is a felony of the second degree
unless the victim is under the age of 14,
in which case the offense is punishable
as a felony of the first degree.
The statute, however, as well as the entire
Utah Code Annotated, fails to define what sodomy is.

In

Black's Law Dictionary, sodomy is defined as the carnal
copulation of human beings in other than the natural
manner.

This definition is, however, not the definition

that Utah has followed.

The Utah Supreme Court has

deferred to the common law definition of sodomy in the
case of State of Utah v. Johnson, 137 P.632, 44 Utah 18,
(Utah 1913}.

In that case, the Court reversed a sodomy

conviction because the sexual contact was between the
Defendant's mouth and that of a penis.

On page 632 of

137 Pacific Reporter, the Court states that they must look
to and be governed by the common law definition of sodomy.
The Utah legislature in 1923 amended the former sodomy
statute, Section 76-53-22 Utah Code.Ann., to include
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the use of the mouth.

Then, in the 1933 case of the

State of Utah v. Peterson, 17 P.2d 925, 81 Utah 340
(Utah 1933), the Court solidified the legislative enactment
by

sust~ining

a conviction of sodomy that included

copulation in the mouth.
In the Peterson case, the element
.
of penetration ~as proved as the facts were stipulated to
be as stated on page 926 as follows:
On September 8, 1931, at Salt Lake
county , state of Utah, the defendant
Clyde Peterson "inserted his sexual
organ, to-wit, his penis into the
mouth of Elaine Giles;
The element of penetration was proven in the Peterson case
by the use of the word, into.
In sodomy, mere contact is not enough.

v. Angier, 112 P . Zd 659, (Cal App. 1941).

People

For a conviction

of sodomy, a necessary element that needs tc be proven is
penetration.

U.S. v. Milby, 400 F.2d 702, C.A.,(Kentucky

1968); State v. Pratt, 309 A.2d 864 (Maine 1973); State v.
Swain, 172 So.2d 3, (Florida 1965); State v. Shambo, 322 P.2d
657, (Montana 1958); State v. Withrow, 96 S.E.2d 913, (West
Virginia 1957); State v. Whittmore, 122 S.E.2d 396, (North
Carolina 1961); Cole v. State, 179 P.2d 176, (Oklahoma 1947);
Commonwealth v. Yingling, 19 Cambria 142, (Pennsylvania 1951):
People v. Hickok, 216 P.2d 140, (California 1950); People v.
Ramos, 270 P.Zd 540, (California 1954).

-8-
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Case law is replete with examples.
Commonwealth v. Althoff, 16 D

&C

In the case of
2d 640,

(Pennsylvania 1949),

the Defendant undressed his young son, turned the boy on
his stomach, got on top of the boy_ and moved up and down in
an apparent attempt at sex, but could not penetrate because
the Defendant was in a drunken state.

The Court held there

was no penetration, therefore there was no sodomy.

In the

case of State v. Alkhowarizmi, 421 P.2d 871, 101 Ariz. 514,
(Arizona 1966), a policeman came upon a truck at night and
turned his flashlight on two male suspects in the back of the
truck.

The policeman testified that both males were lying

down in close proximity to one another, that their trousers
an~

shorts were pulled down so as to expose their private

parts,

t~at

the officer

at least one of the men had an erection and that
~~;

:.

obser~ed

what appeared to be a moist milky-white

substance on one of the men's leg.

The Court held that

there was no proof of penetration, therefore, there could
be no conviction of sodomy.

In the case of State v. Williams,

580 P.2d 1341, 224 Kan. 468,

(Kansas 1978), the Defendant's

penis penetrated the lips of the complaining witness,
although further penetration was prevented by clenched
teeth.

The Court held that this was penetration to sustain

a conviction of sodomy.

In another case, State v. Elliott,

557 P.2d 1105, 89 N.M. 756,

(New Mexico 1978), the Court
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held that any penetration, however slight, proves this
element that is essential for the crime of sodomyo
In another case, the touching of a female sex organ with the
mouth or tongue of the Defendant did not constitute
penetration.

State v. Olsen, 258 P.2d 810, (Washington 1953).

In the case of ·state v. Hill, 176 So.

719, 179 Miss.

732,

(Mississippi 1937), the Court held that where the Defendant
male "sucked the private sexual parts" of the female
prosecution witness, there was no penetration, and hence,
there was no case of sodomy.
By the above, it can be seen that in the case at
hand, there was a failure of the prosecution to prove
penetration which 1s a necessary and proper element to prove
the.crime of sodo1!.1Y·

There is no riebate, that pursuant to
~~

the 1923 Utah statutory enactment and the 1933 Peterson case,
sexual contact by the mouth of one to the sexual organ of
another can also be sodomy, but because the common law
definition still prevails, there is no sodomy in the case at
hand.

ISSUE II
WHETHER OR NOT THE FAILURE TO RECORD
THE CLOSING ARGUMENTS OF THE ATTORNEYS
WAS ERROR WARRANTING A REVERSAL OF THE
CASE.

Both Mr. James L. Shumate, Attorney for the
prosecution, and Mr. Scott J. Thorley, Attorney for the
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Defendant, presented their closing arguments to the jury,
but for some reason not brought forth in the transcript,
these closing arguments were not reported.
Ls. 18, 19, 20).

(T.T. P. 98,

The attorneys are entitled to a reasonable

measure of latitude in closing remarks to the jury.

State

v. Herrera, 499 P.2d 364, 84 N.M. 46, certiorari denied
499 P.2d 355, 84 N.M. 37, certiorari denied 93 S.Ct. 918,
409 U.S. 1110, 34 L.Ed.2d 692,

(New Mexico 1972).

This right

of argument to the jury contemplates a liberal freedom of
speech and wide range of discretion, illustration, and
enumeration.
1976).

Cervantes }l.~St'at~>,-~556 P.Zd 622, (Oklahoma

Utah has also adhered to this latter-mentioned

proposition.

State v. Valdez, 513 P.Zd 422, 30 Utah 2d 54,

(Utah 1973).

However,· there are limitations.

In State

..

V . ,....'' .

~·

'

;;..:_.

... .

.••:.t· :i.~

·'

Randall, 443 P.2d 434, (Arizona 1968), ·the Court held that
the prosecution rebuttal argument should contain itself to
answering issues brought out in the argument of the defense
and should serve no other purpose.

The scope of the closing

argument should not be unduly restricted.

People v. Lundy,

533 P.2d 920, 188 Colo. 194, (Colorado 1975).
case, the purpose of argument is not merely a

In a criminal
discuss~on

of the facts and any limitation of the argument is to
deprive the Defendant to the right to have his counsel make
the proper argument and discussion of the application of
the laws to the facts shown to exist.
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142 P.2d 584, 65 Idaho 210,

(Idaho 1943).

It is also

improper for an attorney to argue legal theories to a Jury
when the jury has not been instructed on those theories.
Lloyd v. State, 576 P.2d 740,

(Nevada 1978).

In the Lloyd

case, which was a rape ·prosecution, the trial Court properly
prohibited counsel from instructing the jury in the closing
argument, on alternative theories of law relating to rape.
A Court has also held that it is error for an attorney to

define the term,
failed to do so.
1964).

11

reasonable doubt" when the Court has
Gresham v. State, 396 P.Zd 374, (Oklcihoma

Another case held that statements by the

prosecution or the defense to the jury upon law, must be
combined to the law as set forth in the instructions.
State v. Estill, 492 P.2d 1037_, 80 Wash. 2nd 196, (Washington
1972) .

Where a prosecutor repeatedly rnistated the law and

implanted in the jury an erroneous conception which
prejudiced the Defendant, a fair trial under certain
circumstances may have been denied.
1150, (Wyoming 1978).

Jones v. State, 580 P.2d

The argument of counsel is to be

confined to the questions that are at issue \-and evidence
relating thereto.
735, (Kansas 1975).

State v. Irving, 538 P.2d 670, 217 Kan.
The Oklahoma Court has said that a

prosecuting attorney should confine his arguments before a
jury to fair discussions of issues in the case, and improper

-12-
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remarks objected to will be considered and construed in
reference to the evidence.

If it appears that the improper

argument may have determined the verdict, judgment will be
reversed.

Harvell v. State, 395 P.2d 331,

(Oklahoma 1964).

It is also improper for an attorney to argue matters which
were not or could have not been introduced into evidence.
State v. Smith, 561 P.2d 739, 114 Ariz. 415 (Arizona 1977).
The Arizona Cburt has also held that reference 1n an

~rgument

to the jury to anything not legally admissable against the
Defendant is highly improper and can justify a reversal.
State v. Harden, 406 P.2d 406, 99 Ariz. 56,
Another Court reversed

(Arizona 1965).

a conviction where the prosecution

theory of the robbery in question was wholly speculative
The argument being by· inuendo

and unsupported by evidence.

and conjecture , that the victim was

rnurdere~

as a result of

an attempted robbery by the poverty-stricken Defendant.
Hervey v. People, 495 P.2d 204, 178 Colo. 38,

(Colorado 1972).

In another Court, the prosecution's closing argument in a
sodomy case that, because the Defendant had previously been
imprisoned where d_eviant sexual practices are common, the
jury could infer the Defendant's guilt of the
sodomy.

crime~o~

This was highly improper and was reversable error.

Soap v. State, 562 P.2d 889,

(Oklahoma 1977).

In addition,

it has been held that a prosecutor must exercise care in
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addressing the jury during argument and must avoid
references to personal opinion and irrelevant material.
State v. Smoot, 590 P.Zd 1001, 99 Idaho 854, (Idaho 1978)0
A~cord

State v. Murrell, 585 P.Zd 1017, 224 Kan. 689, (Kansas

1978).
Utah has also decided upon this issue.

In the

case of State v. Trusty, 502 P.Zd 113, 28 Utah 2d 317,
(Utah 1972), the Court held that any comment by a prosecutor
which in a substantial way impairs or disparrages the right
of the Defendant to claim the privilege as improper.

That if

there is a possibility that the comment prejudiced the
Defendant in a sense that there is any likelihood that there
may have been a different result, the error should be deemed
prejudicial· and another trial shoµld be granted.

However,

the converse is also true, unless both propositions are
affirmatively shown, there should be no reversal.

The

determination of those propositions is properly within the
discretion of the trial Courto

The trial Court's decision

will be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion.
However, the Supreme Court must be able to· be in a position
to know what was said so that it can analyze same.

St~te

Black, 551 P.Zd 518, (Utah 1976).
Even more in point is the case of In Interest of
Trotter, 598 P.2d 557, (Kansas 1979).

That case held the

-14-
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v.

failure of the trial Court to provide either a Court
Reporter or electronic equipment to record proceedings or
to keep adequate notes itself from which a Record on Appeal
may be prepared, constitutes an abuse of discretion entitling
a party to a new trial.

In a New York case, the trial

Court committed· error directing that the summation be had
in a trial in the absence of the presiding Justice and
...

·.......-

the official stenographer.

The Court held that the judgment

be reversed and a new trial be granted.

It is interesting

to note that this case is a civil case, and not a criminal
case whereby the standards would be even more strict.

This

latter-mentioned case is Aronson v. Bass, 229 N.Y.S. 201,
(New York 1928).
It can be easily seen from

all~of

the above cases

that a closing argument and ·what 1s sa.id therein is of
significant import.

In the case at hand·, because of factors

unknown to all, no transcript of the closing arguments was
made.

Because the trial Court Judge has full and absolute

control over trial Court proceedings, it can only be assumed
that through the inadvertence, neglect, or negligence of the
trial Court, the closing arguments were not recorded s9 that
judgment can be passed upon the contents thereof by the
Utah Supreme Court.

We need not be put into a position of

speculating as to what was said in the closing arguments.
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Hence, a reversal or at least a reversal and remand is
very much. in order based upon this issue alone.

ISSUE III
WHETHER OR NOT THE ABSENCE OF THE
DEFENDANT FROM THE COURTROOM DURING
JURY SELECTION WAS ERROR .
.
The record includes much dialogue between the
Court, the prosecutor and the defense counsel in regards
to the Defindant's condition and the Defendant's absence
from the Courtroom during the selection of the jury.

(T.T. P. 2, L.30).
Ls~l-30)o

(T.T. P. 3, Ls.1-30).

(T.T. P. 5, Ls.l-23)G

(T.T. P. 4,

During these discussions,

the prosecutor and the defense counsel both concluded
without any evidence or testimony to substantiate· same,
that the Defendant)· was substantially· intoxicated at the
commencement of the trial.

At that time the Defendant was

incarcerated .1n the jail which is in close proximity to the
Courtroom.

The Court also made the conclusion that the

Defendant was intoxicated and jumped to the conclusion
that·the Court should commence the trial without the
Defendant at least through the jury selection.
The prosecutor cited as authority to allow
the trial to commence without the Defendant 77-35-17.
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(Erroneously cited in the Record as 17-35-17).
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The prosecutor

stated that he relied upon sub-paragraph (2) that allegedly
justified the Defendant's absence from the triai.

The

proper portions of this said statute are as follows:
In all cases the defendant shall have the
right to appear and defend in person .Jnd
by counsel. The defendant shall be
personally present at the trial with the
following exceptions:

In prosecutions for offenses not punishable
by death, the defendant's voluntary absence
from the trial after notice to defendant
of the time for trial shall not prevent the
case from being tried and a verdict or
judgment entered therein shall have the same
effe'ct as if defendant had been present;

This sub-paragraph (2) states that the Defendant's absence
must·be voluntary and requires notice to the Defendant.
First of all, it is not even known that the Defendant
was intoxicated, it was only presumed.

Therefore, without

evidence or testimony, there is no way of knowing if the
Defendant's absence was voluntary.

Then in addition, there
Consequently, the

was no notice given to the Defendant.

prosecutor, the defense counsel and the Court are all in
error in allowing this matter to proceed and the JUry be
selected without the presence of the Defendant.
A Defendant's right to be present

Courtroom at all stages of the trial

15

lTI

the

a basic right guarantee(
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by the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitutiono

State v. Carver, 496 P.Zd-676, 94 Idaho 677,

(Idaho 1972).

The Carver case went on to state that the

purpose of having an

accuse~

present at trial is to insure

t: 1at he has first hand knowledge of the actions taken which
1

lead to the

ev~ntual

outcome of the trial.

It is particularly

important that he knows how the jurors who decided the facts
were- selected.
(\iontana 1978);

Ac.cord State v. Musgrove, 582 P. 2d 1246,
Hanley v. State, 434 P.2d 440, (Nevada 1967).

There are cases that discuss the facts thar would
justify the Defendant's waiver of his right to be present.
In State v. Corriz, 522 P.Zd 793, 86-N .. M. 246,

(New Mexico 1974)

the Court held that where the· Defendant's conduct in the
Courtroom

on?~

the first day of trial was obscene and disruptive,

;

the trial.Court could exclude him from the trial.
an~ther

In

case, another Defendant who was proceeding pro se

refused to enter the Courtroom, resisted attempts by
deputies to be placed in there, and was subsequently placed
by force 1n a nearby room where he could hear proceedings

and at all times was free to attend the trial if he so chose;
the Defendant thereby waived his right to be present ~t trial.
Parker v. State, 5Sq P.2d 1298, (Oklahoma 1976).

The same

result would be where the Defendant was giving admonitions and
chanting, which interrupted the pro~eedings, the trial Court
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could exclude the Defendant from the Courtroom during trial.
State v. Williams, 501 P.2d 328,11 Or.App. 227,

(Oregon 1972).

The Utah legislature felt that the presence of the
Defendant at trial was so important that they passed the
statute requ1r1ng same.

Section 77-27-3, Utah Code Ann.,

1953 as amended· states as follows:
If the prosecution is for a felony, the
defendant must be personally present it
the trial, but if for a misdemeanor, the
trial may be had in the absence of the
defendant; if, however, his presence is
necessary for the purpose of identification,
the court may, upon application of the
pros.ecuting attorney, by an order or
warran~ require the personal attendance
of the defendant at the trial.
This said statute utilizes the word, "must" and hence, it
~oncluded
f f:J.~·~~~,~H.~.

can only be
,:;:{> ~:,..;r.Wk.-r·

·

is . maiidato.ry.

that the Defendant's presence at trial

However, Utah has held that a Defendant who

absconds in the middle of his trial 1s an exception to the
rule.

State v. Myers, 508 P.2d 41, 29 Utah Zd 254,

(Utah).

In the case of State v. Mannion, 57 P. 542, 19 Utah SOS,
45 L.R.A. 638, 75 Am. St. Rep. 753, (Utah), the trial Court
was held to have committed reversable error by denying the
defendant who was convicted of assault with intent to rape
his six-year-old daughter, when during the trial, after the
prosecutrix had said that she was "afraid to tell" because
of the Defendant, the Court ordered the Defendant to a place
in the Courtroom where the prosecutrix couid not see him
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and he could not hear her testimony.

Another Utah case has

stated that the entitlement of the accused to both his and
his attorney's presence at a critical stage of criminal
proceedings is an inviolate right.

The denial of that right

means that injury to the accused is conclusively presumed

.

and the Supreme· Court must reverse the lower Court conviction.
State v. Codianna, 573 P.2d 343, certiorari denied, 99 S.Ct.
219,

(Utah 1977)..

In addition, the Myers case mentioned ab(.1-li"P.

passed judgment upon the immediately above-mentioned statute
and by case law reiterated that the Defendant must be
personally presentJat trial .
.... ~)Ill'

The fundamental right of the accused to be present
at his trial at all stages of the proceedings includes the
right of the Defendant to be present in such a physical and
mental condition as to be able to comprehend the nature of
the proceedings and to assist in his own defense.

State v.

Hancock, 426 P.2d 872, 247 Or. 21, (Oregon 1967).

In

addition, the Defendant should be present when there occurs
something which concerns his case and about

~hich

he might

possibly either take action or make practical suggestions.
State v. Carcerano, 390 P.2d 923, 238 Or. 208, certiorari
denied 85 S.Ct~ 921, 380 U.S. 923, 13 L.Ed.2d 807, (Oregon
1964).

An important case in Utah has held that not only

does the Defendant have a right and duty to be present at all
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stages of the trial, but the Defendant should also be present
where any communication between the Judge and Jury takes
place.

State v. Lee, 585 P.2d 58,

(Utah 1978).

The trial

transcript is replete with communications between the Court
and the Jury outside the presence of the Defendant .
.
In view of all of the above, it appears like
again we have an issue that in and of itself would justify
.

,1

~

a reversal of a conviction.

Even in the lightest interpreta-

J'.I~

tion, a reversal would be justified because a remand to the
trial Court as to the- reason for the Defendant's absence is
now moot.

Also correlated with this issue is the fact

that the trial Court had the obligation to make an inquiry
as to the nature of
do: this also.

the~Defendant's

Consequently1.~~this,.

. . . ; : :· .

!!~-:.~~~ ~ ~-,
t";
~ ~~s~ -~-~~:--.
~

absence, but failed to
too,

would.~be

a sole and

~~· ;/~ ~.-'.-~..~:..,· c:
~:; : .:·~

separate reason for a reversal.
ISSUE

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A DUTY TO
INQUIRE INTO THE TESTIFYING CAPACITY
OF THE STATE'S PROSECUTING WITNESS
WHO WAS A MINOR MALE CHILD.
Throughout the transcript, there are references
to the testimony of John Cooper and there is a large
amount of testimony by John Cooper himself.

There is no

question that John Cooper was thirteen years of age at
the time of the trial.

The question that comes to mind is
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to whether John Cooper was mature enough to understand the
consequences and import of his testimony.

In the case of

State v. Morasco, 128 P. 571, (Utah 1912), a six-year-old
boy was the State's prime witness in a case involving an
assault with intent to commit the crime against nature.

At

.

that time, there was a 1907 law in effect that precluded
children under ten-years-of-age from becoming witnesses.
However, the boy was questioned as to whether he knew what
it was to tell the truth and to tell a lie.

The boy also

was aware that he will ·be punished if he tells a lie and
that God wants him to tell the truth.

Because of the

response to these questions, the Court made a determination
that the boy was capable of testifying as a competent
witness.

The Court held that·whether or not a child p6ssesses

the necessary qualifications to testify is for the trial
Court to determine in the exercise of its sound discretion.
In the absence of an abuse of this discretion, the ruling
will not be disturbed on appeal.

In the case at hand, it

is true that the prosecuting witness is thirteen-years-of-age,
but the fact stands that he is still a minor child under
the .definition of the law.

However, absolutely no inquiry

as to whether or not the child possessed the necessary
qualifications to testify were made by the Court.

It can

therefore be inferred that the Court concluded John Cooper
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was a competent witness without ·any inquiry into his
competency.

Consequently,. the inaction of the Court 1s 1n

direct contravention to the standards set up in the
Morasco case.

The same standard as set out in the Morasco

case was further solidified and reiterated in the case of
..

State v. MacMiYlan, 145 P. 833, (Utah 1915).

In the

MacMillan case, the Defendant was on trial for taking
indecent· liberties with a child between seven and eight-yearsof-age.

On page 835, the Court reiterated the necessity of

the Court to utilize its sound discretion in making this
determination as follows:
The question of -=-the competency of a child
who-is called as a-witness, in the very
na ture:~~of -things', '~must;;!·to :a large>:extentt{~ ·~.
at '~le~ast, be ··lce:ft- to - the>0sound discretion'',. ·: .of,. ~t~e'":;triaL~~~~tqur~-~,'};::::Wli:~~"that· co~rt\'·has:: ~;~1r·

passed~upon ;th~;, ~~ue:sticrn~rei the'i· way·,~~{:we ·:._,._
cannot inter£~~e., .:unless ··it is cl.early :;f;_~i
made ."to appe.a-f1;:;that -the.~icourt abused the

discretion vested in it.
In yet another Utah case, State v. Zeezich, 210 P. 927,
(Utah 192.2), the .prosecution witness was an eight-year-old
girl.

In this case, on voir dire_

e~amination,

it was

illicited ·from the girl that she not only knew what it
to tell the truth and what it

15

15

to tell a lie, but she
•

also knew that if she told a lie she would be punished.
The girl further testified to the fact that her mother and
·the District Attorney-had-instructed her to tell the
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truth.

Again, a serious inquiry was made into the capacity

of the prosecuting witness to adequately testify.

The only

inquiry that was made in the case at hand was made_ by the
defense counsel as to the competency of John Cooper.

Mr. Thorley asked if John Cooper understood the importance of
telling the truth in the situation and asked whether or not
he had told the truth.

However, no other inquiry

~as

made

as to whether or not he understood the distinction between a
truth and a lie and

not~ing

in the record shows that John

Cooper had the capacity to rece1\·e impressions of the facts
as required in the Morasco case.
Accordingly, because the Court made no such
inquiry into the capacity to testify of John Cooper, the
conviction shoutd be overturned and reversed or should at
least be remanded to the trial Court for an adequate inquiry
thereto.

ISSUE V
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS NECESSARY TO GI\.E
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY OVER AND ABOVE
THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE GIVEN IN ORDER
TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF SODOMY.
The record indicates that several instructions
were given to the jury.

One instruction was on the

presumption of innocence of the Defendant.
instruction was on reasonable doubt.

Another

Another instruction
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was on two reasonable interpretations.
instruction was on forcible

Yet, another

sodomy and another instruction

was on the consent to sodomy.

Finally, there was an

instruction that to find the Defendant guilty of forcible
sodomy, the Jury must find the following:

(1) That the

.

offense, if any, occured at and within Iron County, State
of Utah;

(2) That the offense, if any, occured on or about

July 3, 1981, although the exact date is immaterial;

(3) That

at said time and place the said Defendant, Hoyt Glenny,
did engage in a sexual act involving his mouth and the penis
of John Cooper; and (4) That at said time John Cooper was
under the age of fourteen years.
In Dougherty v. State, 471 P.2d 212, 86 Nev. 507,
(Nevada 1970), the Court held that accurate instructions
upon the ·basic elements of the offense charge is essential
and failure to instruct as to those elements constitutes
reversable error.
penetration.

There was no instruction given on

Yet penetration is a requisite element of the

crime of sodomy as can be seen from the law and argument
brought forth in Issue I above.

The obligation 1s one

that is placed directly upon the shoulders of the Court, and
:;_,

not of counsel for the parties.

People v. Campbell, 589

P. 2d 1360, (Colorado 1978).
In the case of State v. Zeezich, supra,
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the jury was instructed by the Court to examine the testimony
of the child with care and caution on account of her tender
years and susceptibility to wrong impressions concerning
facts.

In the case of State v. Dixon, 199 P.2d 775, (Utah

1948), the prosecution witness was a boy under six-years-ofA

ageo

Again, as in the Zeezich case, the trial Court gave

a cautionary instruction calling the jury's attention to the
fa~t

that the boy was of tender years.

In accordance with

that necessity of .instruction to the Jury, the State v. Morasco

case supra, also gave an instruction that the testimony of
the minor should be examined with caution because of his
age and unfamiliarity with the subject matter under

investigation and that children are susceptible to impressions
oftentimes erroneous.

In the case at hand, no

~autionary

instructions were given as in these three immediately
above-mentioned cases.
It is because of the lack of the two
instructions, one on penetration and the other a cautionary
instruction as to the testimony of a child, that the trial
Court has erred enough to warrant a reversal of the
conviction previously sustained.
ISSUE VI

WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED
EFFECTIVE COUNSEL.
There are several issues incident to the
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acts and/or omissions of Mr. Scott J. Thorley, Attorney
for the Defendant, in the trial Court.

These issues

could all be treated independently but they all appear to
eminent from the advocacy, or lack of advocacy as the case
may be, of Mr. Thorley.

First of all, a change of venue

from Iron County to a more liberal venue, such as Salt
Lake County, should have been at least attempted by counsel.
Because of the greater concentration of citizens 1n rural
Utah counties who are against the consumption of alcoholic
beverages, as well as the inordinate amount of influence
that the prosecutor had w1th the various jurors because of
his contact with them and their knowledge of him, the
Defendant most probably would have £aired much better
venue.~~ such

as Salt Lake County.

in·

a

Secondly;_ because of the

testimony illicited from the Defendant, as· to. his drinking
alcoholic bevera-ges, the defense counsel should have made
a voir dire examination of the jury as to how they felt
about persons who imbibe in alcoholic beverages, coupled
with an inquiry as to whether or not they could be fair and
impartial towards an imbiber.

Thirdly, it appears that

the defense counsel himself concluded that the Defendant
was intoxicated without having any evidence presented
that would substantiate this conclusion.

It was at least

partially because of the defense counsel's representations
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as to the Defendant's intoxication that the Judge concluded
intoxication to be true, which ultimately resulted in the
Defendant's absence during the jury selection.

Fourthly,

the defense counsel could have insisted upon a continuance
so as to effect the presence of the Defendant at all stages
~

of the proceedings.

Fifthly, the defense counsel only met

with the Defendant briefly prior to the trial and it is
highly questionable whether the brief encounter time was
enough to actively prepare for trial.

See the Affidavit of

the Defendant, Hoyt Glenny, that is attached hereto and is
hereby incorporated by reference as though set forth
herein.

fu~ly

Sixthly, it has been established by interviews with

the Defendant's present counsel, Mr. Stephen Mark Stephens,
that~he

Defendant has had no sexual urges or drives for at

least ten to fifteen years prior to July 3, 1981, and that
the said Defendant has been a hard-core alcoholic for at
least twenty years prior to July 3, 1981.

It is submitted

that not only should the prior counsel have illicited these
important facts, but that they should have been brought up
at the time of trial.
attached hereto.

See the Affidavit of Hoyt Glenny

Seventhly, there was a need for an expert
~

witness to testify that hard-drinking alcoholics often
lose their sex drives as a result of the alcoholism.

All of

the above on the surface may appear to be Monday-morning-
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quarterbacking, but an in-depth review of the case law
indicates that the Courts have given much import to the
competence of a defense counsel in a criminal case and
there are basic standards that have to be met, and if they
are not met, the Defendant has not been adequately
represented in the trial Court.
In the case of Reece v. Georgia, 76 S.Ct. 167,
350 U.S. 85, (United States 1955), the Court held that the
effective assistance of counsel in a criminal case is a
constitutional requirement of due process which no member of
the Union can disregard.

The Reece case cited as authority

and embellished upon the most famous case of Powell v.
Alabama, 53 S.Ct. SS, 287 U.S. 45, (United States 1932).
The Powell case, amongst other things, reiterated the rule
that the right of the accused to assistance of counsel
includes the right of assistance from the time of
arraignment up to the preparation for trial as well as
thereafter.

Powell also held that attorneys, beings they

are officers of the Court, are bound to render service when
required by appointment as counsel for the accused.

It

is to be noted that the Reece case included the element of
effectiveness to this necessity of counsel.

In the case of

Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 FR2d 30, Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, (United States 1962), the Pefendant petitioned for
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a Writ of Habeas Corpus to the United States District Court
which was dismissed, and the Court herein, the Court of
Appeals, granted the Petition being it showed the existence
-

of substantial defenses on behalf of the Defendant who had
been convicted of first-degree murder and they were
sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the Defendant had
been denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial.
Again, the Court talked in terms of the Defendant being denied
the effective assistance of counsel at his trial.
In Utah, the claim of inadequacy or effectiveness
of counsel must be established by the record that counsel
was ignorant of the facts of the law resulting in the withdrawal of a crucial defense and reducing the trial to a farce
and sham.

State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, (Utah 1976).

Also, Utah has held that counsel is required to possess
ordinary legal knowledge and skill common to members of his
profession, but he is not required to know all of the law
nor to second-guess the trial Judge.
437 P.Zd 686, (Utah 1968).

Young v. Bridwell,

Another Utah case has held that

there is an implie~ covenant in an attorney's relationship
with his client that he will represent the client's
interest with competence and diligence.

584 P.2d 894,

(Utah 1978).

Dunn v. McKay,

Another case held that a

defense counsel who failed to do anymore investigating of a
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murder charge against the Defendant than to interview
the prisoner failed to render effective assistance of
counsel.

That on remand, the Defendant would have the

burden of showing the existence of admissable evidence
which could have been uncovered by reasonable investigation
and would have proved helpful at the original trial.
However, if the changed circumstances made it impossible for
the Defendant to produce any helpful evidence, the burden
would shift to the prosecution to show the absence of any
prejudice because of the inadequacy of counsel.

McQueen

v. Swenson, 498 ·F.2d 207, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
(United States 1974).
Because there are at least seven maJor factors
involving the ineffectiveness of the trial Court's defense
~oun~el as enumerated above,

th~re is significant reason

and proof that because of the acts and omissions of the
Defendant's counsel, there should either be a reversal
or a reversal and remand for a new trial.

The decisions

above-mentioned requiring the standard of effective counsel
make this so.
CONCLUSION
As can be seen from

the~facts

and law and

argument enumerated above, the Defendant is entitled to
a reversal of the conviction of

sod~my.

In the alternative,
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a reversal and remand may be necessary pursuant to what
has been set forth abovee

In any event, the present

conviction of sodomy should not

be

sustained.

Respectfully submitted,

~.A;;?~
STEPHEN MARK STEPHENS
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1. hereby· certify that I hand-de 1 i vered a copy

of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Earl Darius,
Assistant Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol Building,

Salt Lake City, Utah, this 2nd day of August, 1982.

STEPHENS
Defendant-Appellant
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AFFIDAVIT OF HOYT GLENNY
STATE OF UTAH

)
SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

HOYT GLENNY, being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and says:
I .

That the affiant was the Defendant in Case No.

835, the State of Utah v. Hoyt Glenny, that was tried in the
Fifth Judicial District Court 1n and for Iron County, State
of Utah.

That this said case 1s presently on appeal to the

Utah Supreme Court as Case No. 18143.
I I.

That the affiant had as an attorney in the
above-·mentioned District Court case Mr. Scott J. Thorley who
was appointed by the above-mentioned Court to represent the
affiant in the criminal action which was a case of sodomy.
I I I.

That prior to the trial of the affiant, the
said Scott J. Thorley spent a very minimal and small length
of time talking to the affiant about this matter, and upon
reflection, there are matters and things that should have
been discussed between the affiant and said Scott J. Thorley,
but due to the short length of time the Defendant had with
said Scott J. Thorley, these matters

~ever

came up, or were
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never discussed by the affiant and said Scott J. Thorley.
That these matters include, but are not necessarily relegated
to, the sexual drive and desires of the affiant and the
ch~nge

of venue from Iron County to

a

more liberal venue.

IV.
That for at least fifteen years prior to
the date of the alleged offense in question, July 3, 1981,
the affiant has had no sexual urges or desires.

That

~he

affiant believes that this may be due to the fact that the
affiant has been a heavy-drinking alcoholic for at least
fifteen or twenty years prior to July 3,

1981~

In addition,

if t11ere was any sexual activity that the affiant is so
d.:~bilitated
r~~'.n.y

by emphysema that the affi.ant is unable to have

physical activity without difficulty.

;·~:

V.
Further affiant saith not.
DATED this

~

day of August, 1982.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
of August, 1982.
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